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the Organic Articles, and the substitution of a new Concordat in 1817, practically though not by legislation.

A careful review of the succeeding history in France shows the increasing friction between the two powers, the opposition of the Church becoming ever more dangerous to the state. The Church gained steadily a large part of the ground which it lost at the time of the Revolution. That it did not gain more is due to the growth of the modern spirit of democracy, the development of the common people forming the great middle class, free and sovereign. Grateful to the Revolution for what it had gained, the people suspected that party which so long checked the legitimate development of this great movement and retarded for nearly a century the definite establishment of the Republic. Since the establishment of the Republic, it is true that the clergy under the direction of a shrewd and politic Pope have changed somewhat their attitude toward the established government.

What the results will be it is too early to predict. Will they become reconciled once for all? Will they make mutual concession? Will one submit to the law of the other? Will they begin anew the strife? Will they enter into a complete separation? We know not and no one else knows.

CHARLES L. WELLS.

Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I. By GUSTAV ROLOFF. [Historische Bibliothek. Band X.] (Munich and Leipzig : R. Oldenbourg. 1899. Pp. xiv, 258.)

In the course of those repeated and almost frantic efforts to destroy the Napoleon legend which have been continuous in France since 1870 much wholesome truth has been widely disseminated, but with it some pernicious error. The men of Lanfrey's school pose like their leader as dispassionate seekers after truth, as stern devotees of historical science. But their bitter partisanship is easily discoverable by any who care to follow them in the course of their researches. Among other calumnies which he and they have circulated is the statement that Napoleon neither understood nor was interested in colonial affairs. This is a most remarkable charge, for any investigator may disprove it by means of the officially selected and published correspondence of Napoleon, volumes which stand on the shelves of any good library. But those who go further will be even more amazed by such effrontery. The author of this meritorious volume has examined the archives of the Navy Department in France and gives in his pages abundant proof that Napoleon's care for the colonies of France was intelligent, painstaking and assiduous. For reasons unknown to him the archives of the Foreign Office were not put at his disposal. But others have been permitted freely to search them, and they too furnish abundant evidence to the same effect.

This volume was needed. Everyone knows that the French lost their colonies in the Napoleonic epoch : most suppose that the loss was due to the Emperor's neglect. Dr. Roloff proves how utterly false this supposition is. He gives a succinct and readable narrative of the facts, he sup-

ports his statements by sufficient proof, and he shows satisfactorily how the central stream of European history was now and then affected by Napoleon's lavish expenditure of men and money at the ends of the earth. When the Directory fell, the French colonial empire, once so splendid, was no more. French rule had disappeared from India, Senegal and most of the Antilles; San Domingo was wrecked and virtually independent; mismanagement and peculation had almost ruined Guadeloupe, Réunion and the Ile de France; there was but one remaining possession, Guyana, where French authority was paramount. The French merchant marine had disappeared from the seas and the traffic of what were still called French colonies was conducted by traders from the United States.

Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, his Mediterranean policy in general, so ably sketched by Albert Vandal, the Herculean efforts he put forth to rescue San Domingo and the course of events in the Antilles: all these our author examines in the light of Napoleon's efforts to restore French control where but lately it had been complete. Further, he holds up the acquisition of Louisiana, and the reorganization of the colonies between the negotiation and breach of the treaty of Amiens as conclusive evidence that Napoleon had formed and was carefully working out a comprehensive plan. Incidentally a matter of vital historical importance is discussed, namely Napoleon's confidence in the solidity of his peace, as shown by his exertions for the colonies without reference to upbuilding a sea-power adequate for their defence, or a system of coast and harbor fortifications which would make them impregnable. This certainly does not point to a secret determination on Napoleon's part to bring on the wars which so long devastated western and central Europe.

Further we have a somewhat inadequate account of the social and economic conditions of the Antilles and of Decaen's interesting expedition to India. Between Austerlitz and Erfurt it became clear that in the complications of affairs in Europe France could not hope either for mastery at sea or for a marine peace. But even then Napoleon's activity was prodigious. He covered a new plan of colonial policy comprehending the Balkan peninsula, the shores of the Mediterranean, and the annexation of Spain with all the Spanish colonies to his system. It is a serious fault that the volume under review does not sufficiently discuss this last point nor recount the French efforts in Argentina. We are utterly at variance with the author in the scant note he gives on page 242. The effect of Trafalgar was to emphasize a fact already patent, the weakness of the French navy. But thereafter not even the slightest diminution of effort for colonial expansion is noticeable. What man could do was done. Even when England seized the last remnants of French colonial empire in the east, Réunion and the Ile de France, Napoleon was undismayed. Spain was intractable but Holland was not: when the latter country became a satellite kingdom of the French empire her splendid colonies likewise entered the French system. Fairly assured of continental peace Napoleon at once turned his attention to his colonies old and new. In May, 1811, an expedition of two frigates and a cor-

vette, with fourteen hundred troops and ample supplies, reached Java in safety. A similar one of equal or greater strength destined for the Ile de France was destroyed by the British about the same time. Six months later the British seized Java ; but this fact does not disprove Napoleon's care or concern.

The central truth then is clear : that Napoleon did have a colonial policy comparable to the other great plans which he formed, that he put forth every exertion to carry it out, studying his problems, sparing neither time nor expense in solving them, and generally being deeply concerned to his latest hour with the inter-relations of world politics. It would indeed have been strange if a mind suckled on Raynal's *Two Indies* had belied its earliest manifestations of character and had been false to its whole training.

What then were the causes of Napoleon's colonial failure? The incapacity of Decrès, the minister of naval affairs, and of the naval administration generally, as the supporters of the Napoleonic legend declare? Certainly not ; mediocre as those men may have been the imperial spirit permeated naval administration as it permeated every other department of government. Dr. Roloff, we think, finds the true causes : first, in the necessary weakness of French sea-power due to intervals of peace so short that a navy could not be organized and built ; secondly, in the fact that European interests were more vital than colonial interests after all and that they must have Napoleon's main attention even though at times he jeopardized them for the sake of colonial empire.

We have already noted one grave fault in the discussion of a very important question : it seems ungracious to complain where so much is excellent. But we remark in closing that the authorities given, not as foot-notes, for the taste of readers in Germany as well as here is in revolt against them, but in the appendix, leave something to be desired. Doubtless the author's note-book would confirm every bald reference of "X to Y," date so and so, but in the use of unprinted sources where specific references are made at all the reader may fairly claim a few words of the original. These Dr. Roloff does not give ; yet he finds space for eleven pages of text, printing *in extenso* the instructions of the First Consul to Leclerc, a paper the contents of which at least were well known, even though the context was not. This we are glad he has done, but the other he might not have left undone. The writer's style is somewhat jejune but he avoids in the main those labyrinthine involutions which repel foreigners from the reading of German books. The idea of the essay is commendable ; so, too, on the whole, is the execution.

Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens. By H. M. BOWMAN.
[University of Toronto Studies, History, Second Series, Vol. I., pp. 77-155.] (Toronto. The University Library. 1899. Pp. 79.)

MR. BOWMAN's dissertation is a good piece of work. It has endured the criticism of two famous universities, Leipsic and Toronto, and has